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The widespread tendency, even within AI, to anthropomorphize machines makes it easier
to convince us of their intelligence. How can any putative demonstration of intelligence in
machines be trusted if the AI researcher readily succumbs to make-believe? This is (what
I shall call) the forensic problem of anthropomorphism. I argue that the Turing test provides
a solution. This paper illustrates the phenomenon of misplaced anthropomorphism and
presents a new perspective on Turing’s imitation game. It also examines the role of the
Turing test in relation to the current dispute between human-level AI and ‘mindless
intelligence’.
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1. Introduction
A fundamental dispute is alive again in AI. Several computer scientists once more regard human-level artiﬁcial
intelligence—or ‘artiﬁcial general intelligence’ (AGI)—as a central and achievable goal. Conferences and workshops have
again focused on human-level AI and AGI.1 In a recent article in Artiﬁcial Intelligence, John McCarthy said, ‘Human-level
AI will be achieved . . . I’d be inclined to bet on this 21st century’.2 Some in the ﬁeld, however, see ‘human-level’ AI as
an ill-deﬁned goal3 and others expressly oppose it—Jordan Pollack recently claimed that ‘AI’s great mistake is its assump-
tion that human-level intelligence is the greatest intelligence that exists’, and called for AI to concentrate instead on ‘mindless
intelligence’.4
Critics of AI’s traditional focus on human-level (or human-like) intelligence typically blame the Turing test. For example:
[T]he Turing Test has served to focus much AI research on those facets of human behavior which are least susceptible to
useful generalization precisely because they are not shared by other species . . . The inﬂuence of the Turing Test vision
. . . is a tragedy for AI.5
“Computing Machinery and Intelligence” has led AI into a blind alley. . . . If we focus future work in AI on the imitation
of human abilities, such as might be required to succeed in the imitation game, we are in effect building “intellectual
statues” when what we need are “intellectual tools”.6
Turing’s imitation game has been described as ‘virtually useless’, ‘obsolete’, and ‘impotent’, and machines that (suppos-
edly) can do well in the game as ‘dead ends in artiﬁcial intelligence research’.7 Opponents say that ‘[a]dherence to Turing’s
vision . . . is . . . actively harmful’ and that ‘Turing’s legacy alienates maturing subﬁelds’.8 For many, the moral is clear:
[T]he Turing test should be relegated to the history of science . . . [W]ith its focus on imitating human performance, [it]
is . . . directly at odds with the proper objectives of AI.9
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Turing was ‘far too intelligent to do any such thing’ and that this widespread misinterpretation of ‘Computing Machinery and
Intelligence’ has led to ‘huge amounts of wasted effort’ discussing the purely ‘mythical’ Turing test.10 According to Sloman,
Turing introduced the imitation game, ‘not in order to give a criterion for thinking or for intelligence’, but to provide ‘a basis
for attacking arguments’ against the possibility that a computer could succeed in the game.11
However, Turing did make it clear that he was proposing a test of intelligence in machines. In his famous 1950 paper
he referred to the imitation game as a ‘test’ and as providing a ‘criterion for “thinking” ’ (he even said that his opponent
Geoffrey Jefferson probably ‘would be quite willing to accept the imitation game as a test’).12 In his 1952 radio broadcast,
‘Can Automatic Calculating Machines Be Said To Think?’, Turing said ‘I would like to suggest a particular kind of test that
one might apply to a machine’. He described the imitation game and continued:
Well, that’s my test. Of course I am not saying at present either that machines really could pass the test, or that they
couldn’t. My suggestion is just that this is the question we should discuss. It’s not the same as ‘Do machines think?’, but
it seems near enough for our present purpose, and raises much the same diﬃculties.13
Turing also made it clear that he introduced the imitation game in order to illustrate his approach to intelligence—rather
than, as Sloman claims, to make a technological prediction or rebut objections to machine intelligence. Turing ﬁrst described
the computer-imitates-human game in ‘Intelligent Machinery’ (his 1948 report for the National Physical Laboratory) as a
‘little experiment’ (which, he said, he had actually conducted) based on his thesis that ‘[t]he extent to which we regard
something as behaving in an intelligent manner is determined as much by our own state of mind and training as by the
properties of the object under consideration’.14
I shall argue that Turing’s test is of considerable importance for AI today—and not solely as an intriguing thought exper-
iment or as part of a far-off scientiﬁc goal. Advocates of both human-level AI and of mindless intelligence face the question:
how do we test for intelligence in machines? Both also face a diﬃcult problem that results from the human tendency
to anthropomorphize artiﬁcial systems. This tendency makes it too easy to convince us of the intelligence, human-level or
otherwise, of a machine. Turing provided a test of intelligence in machines that solves this problem.
2. Anthropomorphism in AI
Computer scientists often complain that the public expects intelligent androids to appear any day. Yet science ﬁction and
make-believe can also be found within AI—even at its very beginnings.15 Turing compared what he called his ‘child-machine’
to Helen Keller, said that the machine could not ‘be sent to school without the other children making excessive fun of it’
but it would have ‘homework’, and he suggested that ‘the education of the machine should be entrusted to some highly
competent schoolmaster’.16 Turing was discussing his ‘P-type’ unorganized machines (modiﬁed Turing machines, with no
tape and with ‘pain’ and ‘pleasure’ inputs).17 These existed only as ‘paper machines’—simulations of machine behaviour by
a human being using paper and pencil18—but Turing anthropomorphized them nonetheless.
Illustrative cases of anthropomorphism also include Valentino Braitenberg’s descriptions of his robot vehicles. These
machines are said to dream, sleepwalk, have free will, and ‘ponder over their decisions’; they are ‘inquisitive’, ‘optimistic’,
and ‘friendly’. They even have the ‘a priori concept of 2-dimensional space’.19 David Hogg, Fred Martin, and Mitchel Resnick
gave their Braitenberg-like ‘creatures’ (constructed from LEGO bricks containing electronic circuits) names such as ‘Timid’,
‘Indecisive’, ‘Paranoid’, ‘Insecure’, and ‘Inhumane’. Frantic and Observant are, they said, ‘philosophical’; Frantic ‘does nothing
but think’.20 Masaki Yamamoto too described his robot vacuum cleaner SOZZY as ‘friendly’—and as having ‘four emotions . . .
joy, desperation, fatigue, sadness’.21 Daniel Dennett said that Cog is to have an ‘infancy and childhood’ and will be designed
‘to want to keep its mother’s face in view’. Cog
must somehow delight in learning, abhor error, strive for novelty, recognize progress. It must be vigilant in some regards,
curious in others, and deeply unwilling to engage in self-destructive activity. While we are at it, we might as well try to
make it crave human praise and company, and even exhibit a sense of humour.22
Often the researchers building social robots such as Cog (and especially ‘face’ robots) attempt to avoid anthropomorphism
—for example, by using scare-quotes or other notational devices when describing a face robot’s ‘emotion’ system, and by
claiming that the robot has mere analogues of human emotions.23 In these cases they typically deny that the robot has—
‘real’ or human—emotions.24 (This denial need not presuppose a deﬁnition of ‘emotion’. To use a famous example, we do not
need a deﬁnition of a ‘game’ to be justiﬁed in saying that football is a game and dermatology is not. Nor can we provide
one25: instead we use prototypes and exemplars. Likewise, we do not need a deﬁnition of ‘emotion’ to be justiﬁed in saying
that you have emotions and SOZZY does not.)
Nevertheless, the same researchers who deny that their robots have emotions attribute expressive behaviours to the ma-
chines literally and without qualiﬁcation; in this way they unwittingly anthropomorphize the machines. Kismet, for example,
is said (without scare-quotes) to have ‘a smile on [its] face’, to ‘frown’, and to have a ‘happy and interested expression’ and
a ‘sorrowful expression’.26 Kismet is also said to ‘glance towards’ a toy, ‘look in another direction’, and ‘settl[e] its gaze on
the person’s face’.27 This is not to claim merely that the robot has certain physical conﬁgurations or behaviours. Smiling, for
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distinguishes a smile from a human grimace or facial tic, and from a chimpanzee’s bared-teeth display. Similarly, saying that
Kismet has a happy expression (rather than a ‘happy expression’) is claiming that the meaning of the robot’s ‘facial’ display
is happiness (and not mere ‘happiness’). In saying that Kismet smiles and frowns (as opposed to saying merely that its facial
display is, like an emoticon or photograph, a representation of a smile or frown), Kismet’s creators are claiming that the
robot has a certain communicative intent—the intent possessed by creatures that smile, namely human beings.
In the 1970s Drew McDermott ridiculed the use of ‘wishful mnemonics’ to refer to programs and data structures. He
said that, if the AI programmer
calls the main loop of his program “UNDERSTAND”, he is (until proven innocent) merely begging the question. He may
mislead a lot of people, most prominently himself, and enrage a lot of others. What he should do instead is refer to
this main loop as “G0034”, and see if he can convince himself or anyone else that G0034 implements some part of
understanding.28
McDermott’s aim was to eliminate the use of wishful mnemonics: he said, ‘If we are to retain any credibility, this should
stop’. His recommendation to the ‘disciplined’ AI researcher is to use ‘colourless’ or ‘sanitized’ terms—those with a ‘humble,
technical meaning’.29
Anthropomorphism in AI goes far beyond wishful mnemonics, though. Some of the examples given above could be seen
as mnemonics; for example, Turing’s ‘pain’ or ‘punishment’ signal could instead be referred to as a ‘cancellation’ instruction
(it cancels tentative entries in the P-type’s machine table). In contrast, the claim that a Braitenberg machine has the ‘a priori
concept of 2-dimensional space’ cannot be cashed out in this way. Likewise, although some instances of anthropomorphism
in AI are question-begging, as McDermott points out, other examples give rise to a different problem. Describing SOZZY as
friendly is to engage in make-believe and make a plainly false, rather than a question-begging, claim.30
McDermott requires that AI researchers, before using psychological terms, demonstrate that their programs do implement
psychological properties. But how can a researcher’s effort to ‘convince himself or anyone else’ of intelligence in machines be
trusted if the researcher readily succumbs to anthropomorphism and make-believe—ascribing joy to a robot vacuum cleaner,
for example? This is (what I shall call) the forensic problem of anthropomorphism. This is not the traditional metaphysical
problem of the relation between the physical and the mental, nor the ethical question of how we should treat artiﬁcial
agents; nor does it assume that humans are exceptional. And it poses a different problem from that identiﬁed by McDermott.
The forensic problem of anthropomorphism is this: anthropomorphizing risks introducing bias (in favour of the machine)
into judgements of intelligence in machines—unless the risk is mitigated, these judgements are suspect.
McDermott’s prescription for the ‘disease’ of wishful mnemonics is abstinence.31 Yet ﬁction can be useful (the centre of
gravity and light travels in a straight line are useful ﬁctions in physics), and researchers in social robotics point to advantages
in anthropomorphizing machines—for example, it facilitates human-machine interaction and machine learning. Moreover,
anthropomorphism may be, not eliminable, but natural and inevitable (even McDermott, at the very same time as ridiculing
wishful mnemonics, calls GPS a ‘particularly stupid’ program).32 The forensic problem of anthropomorphism requires that
anthropomorphism be managed, rather than purged. Turing’s imitation game, I shall argue, achieves this.
3. A new perspective on the Turing test
Turing was well aware of how easy it is to anthropomorphize an artiﬁcial system; he said that playing chess against even
a paper machine gives ‘a deﬁnite feeling that one is pitting one’s wits against something alive’.33 (The ‘little experiment’
that, Turing indicated, he had actually performed two or so years before publishing ‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence’
was a chess-playing imitation game, involving a judge and two contestants—a human player and a paper machine.34)
It is impossible now to determine exactly why Turing designed the imitation game as he did. However, the design of
the game does avoid the forensic problem of anthropomorphism. This is because the game includes both a disincentive to
anthropomorphize and a control to screen for any anthropomorphic bias in favour of the machine.
The disincentive to anthropomorphize results from the fact that imitation-game interrogators risk making a real and
readily-exposed error—misidentifying a computer as a human being. The likelihood of this mistake can only be increased
by the tendency to anthropomorphize; hence there is a disincentive to anthropomorphism built into Turing’s game. This
disincentive can be seen at work in the Loebner Prize Contest in Artiﬁcial Intelligence. Judges in this competition are
suspicious, even hostile—rather than behaving like the humans playing with Kismet or chatting with Eliza. For example, they
use nonsense utterances (e.g. ‘Wljso lwjejdo wleje elwjeo wjeol, isn’t it?’), deliberate misspellings (‘what do you think of
the whether?’), slang (‘Yo, whassup?’), and questions probing common-sense knowledge (‘I drove here this morning. Which
side of the road should I have driven on?’) in order to identify the machine.35 Prior to 2004, the Loebner contest differed
from the test in Turing’s 1950 paper, in that it did not have the form of a 3-player game. Instead each judge interviewed
each contestant individually (there were several judges and several contestants); the judges were unaware of the ratio of
computer to human contestants. Judges in this 2-player form of the game appeared to behave strategically, to avoid error:
in the 2000 contest, for example, no judge classed a computer as a human—in fact, in 10 interviews a human was classed
as a computer.36 In the 2003 competition, no judge classed a machine as ‘deﬁnitely a human’, and in 4 interviews a human
was classed as ‘deﬁnitely a machine’.37 The judges refused to anthropomorphize, even when interviewing human beings.
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of managing bias resulting from anthropomorphism. This game is a blind controlled trial of a machine’s ability to answer
questions, in a human-like manner, on a wide range of topics. Including a human contestant in simultaneous interviews
turns the tendency to anthropomorphize into a controlled variable. We may assume that any tendency the interrogator has
to anthropomorphize an unseen contestant is independent of the actual identity of the contestant.38 The consequence is
that the interrogator’s tendency to anthropomorphize does not advantage the machine.
On this new understanding of Turing’s test, a popular objection to the test is wrong-headed. Kenneth Ford and Patrick
Hayes, for example, claim that the test is ‘a poorly designed experiment . . . depending too much on the subjectivity of the
judge’.39 Likewise, the philosopher Ned Block asserts that the test makes whether or not a machine thinks ‘depend on how
gullible human interrogators tend to be’.40 This criticism of Turing’s test is inﬂuential but gets things back-to-front. The
imitation game mitigates anthropomorphic bias introduced by ‘gullible’ judges; it is a well-designed experiment.
4. Mindless intelligence and Turing’s test
Mindless intelligence, in Pollack’s sense, seems to be intelligence without symbols. It is plain that his main target is the
physical symbol system hypothesis; he describes Lisp interpreters, symbols, grammars, and logic or inference engines as ‘the
accoutrements of cognition’. A ‘mindless process’, we may infer, will have none of these.
In this sense of ‘mindless’, it is in fact an error to oppose human-level intelligence and mindless intelligence; it is an
entirely open question whether a mindless machine can achieve human-level intelligence. In consequence, there is a role
for the Turing test as a criterion of human-level mindless intelligence in machines (the imitation game does not test for any
particular cognitive architecture).
Pollack, of course, calls for computer science to stop chasing human-level intelligence—the ‘same old AI goals’ are, he
says, ‘red herrings that promise the practically impossible’. But why is human-level AI impossible? Pollack’s reason is that
‘[s]ymbolic conscious reasoning is . . . a myth’. However, this is to identify the goal of building a human-level intelligence
with that of building a symbolic mind—and this is a mistake, since human-level AI can exploit different architectures.41
(Turing himself recommended trying both symbolic and behaviour-based approaches.42) In fact, Pollack’s call for mind-
less intelligence presupposes a criterion of human-level intelligence in machines, since he claims that dynamical physical
processes can become ‘more intelligent than’ a smart adult human.
Turing shared several of the goals of mindless intelligence.43 What is now called ‘Turing Test AI’ was not his only aim;
his research was wide-ranging.44 Crucially, the common assertion that the Turing test ‘assumes that human thought is the
ﬁnal, highest pinnacle of thinking against which all others must be judged’ is mistaken.45 Turing recognized that his test
measures human-like intelligence and that an intelligent non-human system might behave very differently.46 His hope was
that the imitation game would provide an existence proof of the hypothesis that machines can think. If a machine were to
do well in the imitation game (played numerous times, with different interrogators, and on diverse topics), wouldn’t that
be a convincing demonstration of artiﬁcial intelligence—even to the die-hard naysayer?
5. Blockheads, zombies, and other objections
Any argument for the importance of Turing’s test must address standard objections to the test. The most inﬂuential
philosophical objection is: if a machine does well in the imitation game, this demonstrates merely that the machine behaves
as if it is intelligent (or thinks)—not that it is really intelligent.47 Why say this? One reason proposed is that manifestly
unintelligent programs can pass the test. Some critics point to the success of primitive programs in Loebner’s contests,
especially the early competitions.48 Yet these fail as counterexamples to Turing’s test. Loebner’s test is much easier than
Turing’s (for example, in the protocol for scoring the test); the early competitions also restricted the topics of the questions
and forbade the judges to use tricks—unlike Turing’s test.
To produce an effective counterexample, critics must invent hypothetical entities. For example, a blockhead (after Ned
Block) is a hypothetical program that incorporates a vast look-up table; according to Block, the program he calls ‘Aunt Bub-
bles’ can do well in the imitation game, but has the intelligence only of a ‘jukebox’.49 However, this famous counterexample
does not work.50 In the real world no look-up table device would fool a Turing-test interrogator; given the constraints of
processing speed and storage capacity, the candidate would take too long to answer the questions. Block acknowledges that
a device like Aunt Bubbles is ‘only logically possible, not physically possible’—the machine is, he admits, ‘too vast to exist’. In
his view this does not matter: ‘because we are considering a proposed deﬁnition of intelligence that is supposed to capture
the concept of intelligence, conceptual possibility will do the job’.51 However, Turing did not use his test as a deﬁnition of
(i.e., a logically necessary and suﬃcient condition for) intelligence.52 It is perverse to insist on this interpretation of the test,
in the face of Turing’s saying (in his 1952 radio broadcast) ‘I don’t want to give a deﬁnition of thinking’,53 his acknowl-
edgement (in his 1950 paper) that success in the test is not a necessary condition of intelligence, and his remarks (in his
1952 broadcast) demonstrating his concern with real-world machines—machines that can solve problems, he said, ‘within a
reasonable time’.54 This last excludes look-up table devices of the sort described by Block and others.
Several critics of the Turing test argue as follows: ‘real’ intelligence (or thinking) essentially involves consciousness, and
the imitation game cannot test for this.55 John Searle, for example, appears to take this view; he claims that Turing’s test
aims to detect ‘the presence of mind’ but fails, since it tests only ‘external behaviour’.56 This criticism can be made out
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awareness or ‘feeling’), but is otherwise indistinguishable from a human being. The objection runs: a zombie could pass
Turing’s test, but isn’t it obvious that such a creature does not really think? However, this objection begs two crucial
questions. First, it simply assumes that thinking essentially involves consciousness—ignoring the fact that humans have non-
conscious thoughts. Second, it assumes that a zombie would do well in the imitation game. But it may be that only an
entity capable of conscious thought will pass Turing’s test. This is an entirely open question, which is not settled by the fact
that we can imagine a zombie passing the test (if indeed we can imagine this).
Turning from philosophical to scientiﬁc and engineering objections to Turing’s test, many of these do not attack the test
itself (for example, those objections quoted at the beginning of this paper). Some criticize the use of the test to stipulate
a core goal for AI (namely, the imitation of human performance). Others criticize attempts by researchers working in Good
Old-Fashioned AI to build machines that will pass the test. And the true target of some other objections is Loebner’s annual
contest, on the ground that it encourages programmers to use tricks. All these criticisms could be conceded without any
damage to Turing’s test.
Those scientiﬁc and engineering objections that attack the test directly make, in effect, two related criticisms. The ﬁrst
is: the test fails to assist researchers to build a thinking machine (let alone a mindless ‘insect’ or an ‘intelligence ampliﬁer’
for humans).57 For example, some critics argue that the test is too diﬃcult and fails to provide a practical way forward
for AI.58 Turing recognized the diﬃculty in constructing a machine that would succeed in the game; in his 1952 broadcast
he predicted that it would be ‘at least 100 years’ before a machine ‘stand[s] any chance [of passing the test] with no
questions barred’.59 Nevertheless, if AI researchers are to build a thinking machine, they must have some criterion of when
they have reached this goal. Turing’s test provides such a criterion.
The second criticism is: the Turing test fails to assist researchers to understand—that is, construct a computational theory
of—intelligence. For example, some critics argue that the focus on human-like systems will not help us to understand
intelligence in a generic sense.60 Turing might have agreed; he made it clear that his test is intended to provide a criterion
of speciﬁcally human-like intelligence. Some critics, though, judge Turing’s test too narrow even as a test of human-like
intelligence.61 Here Turing would not have agreed; he chose ‘something like a viva-voce examination’, he said, because it
‘has the advantage of drawing a fairly sharp line between the physical and the intellectual capacities of a man’ and ‘seems
to be suitable for introducing almost any one of the ﬁelds of human endeavour that we wish to include’.62 (The imitation
game can also be used to test for different human intellectual capacities or levels.) Sloman objects that ‘the very idea of
a Turing test or any other test of intelligence is muddled [because] there is no binary divide between things that are and
things that are not intelligent’.63 However, even if the concept of intelligence is fuzzy, the imitation game can be used as a
test of (human-like) intelligence; this is because, as Turing said, we cannot conclude from a contestant’s failing to do well
in the game that the contestant is not intelligent.
The complaint that the imitation game does not help researchers to theorize about intelligence overlooks Turing’s own
very different approach to intelligence. Sloman, for example, claims that a ‘deep’ understanding of human-level intelligence
requires that we identify the mechanisms underlying intelligent human behaviour as solutions to problems posed in human
evolutionary development (clearly the imitation game does not provide this).64 In contrast, Turing said in his 1952 broadcast,
‘As soon as one can see the cause and effect working themselves out in the brain, one regards it as not being thinking, but
a sort of unimaginative donkey-work’.65 In his view, the ordinary concept of intelligence is linked, not to the notion of
underlying mechanisms, but to the notion of people’s responses in speciﬁed conditions (see Section 1). Intelligence in this
sense cannot be understood by the sort of investigation Sloman proposes—but it can be tested in the imitation game, which
explores the human’s response to the machine in carefully circumscribed circumstances.
6. ‘Intelligence is in the eye of the observer’
If AI does abandon the Turing test, what will take its place? One popular approach (with some similarity to Turing’s own
view) is simply to say that ‘intelligence is in the eye of the observer’. Rodney Brooks, for example, uses these very words
(and Pollack’s deﬁnition of ‘mindless intelligence’ speciﬁes that it is intelligent behaviour ascribed by an observer).66 This
approach raises in a graphic way the forensic problem of anthropomorphism.
Brooks claims that ‘it is only an external observer that has anything to do with cognition, by way of attributing cognitive
abilities to a system that works well in the world’.67 This recalls Dennett’s classic stipulation that ‘a particular thing is an
intentional system only in relation to the strategies of someone who is trying to explain and predict its behavior’.68 These
claims raise the possibility that any machine is an intentional system, just because the observer anthropomorphizes the
machine. How is this possibility to be avoided? Dennett has proposed that an observer is justiﬁed in treating a machine as
an intentional system where it is useful (‘convenient, explanatory, pragmatically necessary for prediction’) to do so.69 Brooks
has also suggested that, if the illusion of genuine communication with a machine is shattered less and less, the machine
should be counted as a thinking thing.70
Yet humans may always ﬁnd it ‘convenient’ to adopt the intentional stance when giving common-sense accounts of a
machine’s behaviour. The extravagance with which even AI researchers anthropomorphize machines suggest that Dennett’s
condition (that the observer ﬁnd the intentional stance useful) is too easily satisﬁed. The same problem arises for Brooks’s
suggestion. Many researchers argue that human beings have an evolved tendency to personalize the world (we even see
faces in the clouds)71; if so, the illusion of communication with a machine may be too readily generated.
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observer—a spectator without any inclination to misplaced anthropomorphism, or who is able (despite this inclination) to
make unbiased decisions. However, in the real world ideal observers are hard to ﬁnd, if not impossible. Turing’s imitation
game solves the problem without invoking an ideal observer.
7. Conclusion
Irrespective of the theoretical merits of Turing’s test, there are the familiar economic arguments against employing it.
David Waltz, for example, recently claimed that in the future ‘few agencies or industries are likely to fund research whose
primary goal is to pass some variant of the Turing Test’.72 Yet even if Waltz is correct, those researchers who do want to
develop machines with human-level intelligence will require some standard for determining success. Without a criterion
of human-level intelligence in machines, it is impossible even to theorize about building such devices. Moreover, building
human-level AI requires a test of intelligence in machines that is not undermined by our tendency to anthropomorphize.
The Turing test is anthropomorphism-proofed.
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